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Keeping the Government's Hands Off Our
Bodies: Mapping a Feminist Legal Theory
Approach to Privacy in Cross-Gender

Prison Searches
Teresa A. Miller*

I. THE PROBLEM OF PRIVACY IN THE DOCTRINE OF CRossGENDER SEARCHES

The power of privacy is diminishing in the prison
setting, and yet privacy is the legal theory prisoners rely
upon most to resist searches by correctional officers.
Incarcerated women in particular rely upon privacy to
shield them from the kind of physical contact that male
guards have been known to abuse.' The kind of privacy
that protects prisoners from searches by guards of the
opposite sex derives from several sources, depending on the
factual circumstances.
Although some form of bodily
privacy is embodied in the First, Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments,2 prisoners challenging the
* Associate Professor of Law, University at Buffalo School of Law. I would
like to thank Athena Mutua, Elizabeth Mensch, and Martha McCluskey for their
substantive comments and constructive criticism. I would also like to thank
Isabel Marcus and Lucinda Finley for their support at early stages of my
research. I owe Johanna Oreskovic a debt of gratitude for having the patience of
a saint. Lastly, I would like to thank Joe Schneider for his assistance in
researching this paper.
1. See Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar: Sexual Abuse of Women in
U.S. State 2 (1996):
One of the clear contributing factors to sexual misconduct in U.S.
prisons for women is that the United States, despite authoritative
international rules to the contrary, allows male correctional employees
to hold contact positions over prisoners, that is, positions in which they
serve in constant physical proximity to the prisoners of the opposite sex.
2, First Amendment: Canedy v. Boardman, 91 F.3d 30 (7th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing that a nudity taboo within Islam creates a protected privacy interest
against observation while nude by guard of the opposite sex); but see Jordan v.
Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (suggesting the First Amendment
challenge to opposite sex search better heard as a Fourth or Eighth Amendment
claim in the context of prison); Simth v. Chrans, 629 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. IM. 1986)
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constitutionality of cross-gender searches most commonly
allege privacy violations under the Fourth Amendment
proscription against "unreasonable" searches by the
government.2 Increasingly, however, Eighth Amendment
challenges to cross-gender searches are becoming more
common in the wake of Hudson v. Palmer4 and Turner v.
Safley.
Hudson and Turner narrow the scope of privacy and
lower the standard of review for policies which burden
constitutional rights in prison. In Hudson, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment has no
application in prison cells and suggested that the bodily
privacy of prisoners was similarly extinguished.6 While
only one federal circuit has read Hudson as broadly
eliminating all claims to privacy by prisoners,7 the general
(holding that prisoner's claim to privacy under the First Amendment was
untenable because the fact of incarceration limits constitutional sources of
privacy). Fourth Amendment: Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (recognizing
that Fourth Amendment protects privacy by prohibiting "unreasonable" searches
in context of visual body cavity searches); Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(holding that privacy is the primary interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment). Eighth Amendment: Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir.
1993) (basing protection of women prisoners from intrusive, cross-gender clothed
body searches on Eighth Amendment proscription against "unnecessary and
wanton" infliction of pain). Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause: York v.
Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963) ("the security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police is basic to a free society and is therefore 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty,' embraced within the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment"), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964). The Ninth
Amendment was explicitly rejected as an independent source of privacy in Fair v.
Brown, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13428.
3. U. S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[tihe right
of the people to be secure in their persons.., against unreasonable search and
seizures .... "
4. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
5. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
6. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527-28. ("A right of privacy in traditional Fourth
Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual
surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security
and internal order."). The court goes on to emphasize that "'floss of freedom of
choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement.'" Id. at 528 (quoting Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)).
7. See Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1006 (1996) (interpreting Hudson as holding that prisoners have no reasonable
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment). "Wolfish assumed without
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effect of the case was to limit drastically the degree of

privacy to which prisoners could lay claim. This remnant
of a right to Fourth Amendment privacy inhered only to
prisoners' bodies, particularly as to searches viewed or
conducted by guards of the opposite sex.' However, in
Turner, the Supreme Court reduced to a rational basis the
standard by which impingements on prisoners' privacy are
judged. Any prison policy burdening a constitutional right
became permissible so long as it was rationally related a
penological objective. In reducing the power of prisoners to
assert privacy-based challenges to prison regulations, the
Supreme Court made it painfully clear that courts were not
to second guess the judgements of prison officials. In effect,
the Court elevated the judgements of correctional
authorities to a near dispositive level.
Privacy as interpreted by the federal courts is
therefore problematic for incarcerated men. When male
prisoners invoke privacy doctrine for protection against
unwanted intrusions upon their bodies by guards of the
opposite sex, they frequently run into doctrinal roadblocks.
In Sex & Surveillance: Gender, Privacy and the
Sexualization of Power in Prison,9 I contend that there is a
great deal of confusion within the rules regulating crossgender searches and that much of the confusion stems from
misconceptions about how power and sex influence
deciding that prisoners retain some right of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment. Five years later the Court held that they do not." Id. 146.
8. See Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993); Lee v.
Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1981); Covnino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 78
(2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that there is "little doubt that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable the retention of a limited right of bodily privacy even in
the prison context"); Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1415 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 931 (1993) (recognizing that prisoners retain the right to
bodily privacy); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1988);
Cumbey v. Meachum, 684 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); see also
Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir.1994) ("'[O]ne of the clearest
forms of degradation in Western Society is to strip a person of his clothes. The
right to be free from strip searches and degrading body inspections is thus basic
to the concept of privacy.'") (quoting 3 Privacy Law and Practice
25.02[1]
(George B. Trubow ed., 1991).
9. Teresa A. Miller, Sex & Surveillance: Gender, Privacy & the Sexualization
of Power in Prison, 10 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 291 (2000).
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interactions between guards and prisoners. 10 Among these
misconceptions are biases about the sexual vulnerability of
female guards, biases that negatively affect the physical
security of male prisoners." When federal judges establish
the parameters of cross-sex contact between guards and
prisoners, they are strongly influenced by the stereotypes
of men as sexual aggressors and women either as sexual
victims (female prisoners) or asexual nurturers (female
guards).12 These stereotypes are powerful. In fact, they
elevate stereotyped notions of power within traditional
gender roles over the actual disparity of power that exists
between correctional officers and inmates." Thus, judges
tend to deploy privacy primarily as a means of protecting
sexually vulnerable women-both guards and prisonersfrom sexually aggressive men.14 As a result, the sexual
vulnerability of male prisoners is rarely acknowledged and
the link between searches and sexual violence against male
prisoners-commonly occurring at the hands of fellow
inmates-remains largely unexplored."
Furthermore, the stereotype of the sexually aggressive
male prisoner is bolstered by the fact that the privacy of
male prisoners is defined in opposition to the employment
rights of women guards. As I observed in Sex &
Surveillance, federal judges position the privacy rights of
prisoners and the employment rights of guards in diametric
10. See id. at 294.
11. See id.
12. See Rebecca Jurado, The Essence of Her Womanhood: Defining the
Privacy Rights of Women Prisoners and the Employment Rights of Women
Guards, 7 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 1 (1999).
13. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (an early cross-gender
search case in which judges presumed the sexual vulnerability of women in prison
by virtue of their sex alone and prohibited them from working in contact positions
in male maximum security penitentiaries within the Alabama prison system); see
also Miller, supra note 9, at 309; Jurado, supra note 12, at 25, 53 (asserting that
courts adopted a gendered stereotype of women as lacking power over men, "even
when women hold the keys to the prison.").
14. In at least one case, Bagley v. Watson, 579 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Or. 1983),
male prisoners who invoked privacy to prevent female guards from visually
monitoring them in states of undress-gazing upon their naked bodies-were
characterized as either insincere or neurotic.
15. See Miller, supra note 9, at 309.
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opposition.'6 Therefore, when federal judges expand the
employment opportunities of women in the traditionally
male field of corrections by employing women in positions
previously reserved to men-as they are mandated to do by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-the scope of
privacy for male prisoners is subsequently diminished. In
other words, women assigned to "contact" positions within
men's prisons are permitted to monitor visually the naked
bodies of men toileting, showering, and undressing and to
perform random, suspicionless hands-on searches such as
pat frisks and clothed body searches. This assignment
results in less privacy for male prisoners. In addition, the
stereotype of the sexually aggressive male prisoner assists
judges in rationalizing the loss of privacy.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of privacy is also
problematic for incarcerated women, 7 although it raises a
different set of issues for women challenging the validity of
searches conducted by male guards. The primary problem
for men is that privacy doctrine emerges from concerns
about the equal employment of women and is ill-suited to
protecting men from the risk of sexual assault posed
largely by fellow inmates. In contrast, women are precisely
the group that judges seek to protect when they determine
the scope of privacy in the context of cross-gender searches.
Yet the basis of their privacy protection lies in stereotypes
of women that are consistent with women's traditional sex
roles. These stereotypes reflect gender perceptions of
16. Id. at 297.
17. Although an in-depth examination of the problems the doctrine poses for
guards is beyond the scope of this paper, the fact that the doctrine of cross-gender
searches poses problem for women guards as well as inmates is significant
because the problems are interrelated. Guarding prisoners has traditionally been
a man's job. Prior to Title VII's legislative prohibition of sex discrimination in
employment, women were confined to non-contact positions within men's prisons
and underrepresented as guards within women's prisons. As such, women
prisoners were substantially more likely to be closely guarded by men. Ironically,
after the passage of Title VII, states that did restrict the duties of male guards
working in women's prison began to eliminate these restrictions when they
eliminated barriers to women working in men's prison in order to treat men and
women equally. Consequently, in the federal prison system and in most state
prisons, women are still more frequently guarded by men than women.
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female criminal offenders as "fallen women" in need of
correction that will return them to their proper roles as
mothers, wives, and daughters. 8
In The Essence of Her Womanhood: Defining the
Privacy Rights of Women Prisoners and the Employment
Rights of Women Guards, 9 Rebecca Jurado examines how
courts manipulate gendered stereotypes of male and female
prisoners and guards within the doctrine of cross-gender
searches to achieve results consistent with their beliefs
about the traits of men and women. Jurado compares the
scope of privacy for male and female prisoners and
concludes that incarcerated women are afforded more
privacy than their male counterparts. ° She suggests that
the disparity results from the impact of gendered
dualisms 21 (or opposing pairs of stereotypes) on the legal

standards establishing the scope of privacy. For example,
under the Fourth Amendment, privacy is measured by the
degree to which society is prepared to recognize that a
prisoner's subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate.2
Likewise, cross-gender searches run afoul of the Eighth
Amendment when they subject prisoners to more than de
minimis physical or psychological harm, a standard that
has been linked to "vulnerabilities" associated with gender
socialization. 23 It is easy to see how the stereotype of
"hardened, aggressive men," coupled with "vulnerable
women," applied to these standards would result in vastly
different levels of protection for male and female prisoners.
Consistent with the early history of women's
18. See Jurado, supra note 12, at 37.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 46-47 (concluding that the adoption of gender difference as a factor
controlling the extent to which prisoners are afforded privacy led to incarcerated
women having more privacy than their male counterparts).
21. Jurado contends that the history of the U.S. prison system reflects
gendered stereotypes of both prisoners and guards. She further contends that
these stereotypes-conceptualized by gender scholars as dualisms or opposing
pairs of stereotypes-are reflected in contemporary philosophies of employment
and incarceration.
22. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).
23. See Jurado, supra note 12, at 51-52 (discussing Jordan v. Gardner, 986
F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993)).
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reformatory
the separate
incarceration-particularly
system which sought to return "fallen" women to their
proper societal roles as chaste, domestic and girlish
employ
wives 24 --judges
and
daughters,
mothers,
stereotypes of incarcerated women as modest and in need
of protection from their own sexuality. From this
paternalistic construction of women prisoners' privacy
needs, Jurado contends, judges rationalize limiting the
authority of male guards to search women's bodies and to
monitor them visually in states of undress in their living
quarters. For men, incarceration has historically been
based upon a military model of harsh conditions of
confinement, close surveillance, and swift discipline for rule
infractions. Consistent with this model, the stereotype of
hardened men accustomed to harsh conditions is employed
by judges to justify narrowly construing their privacy
needs. This limited notion of men's privacy needs,
combined with the stereotype of female correctional
workers as asexual nurturers and mothers, joins the
contemporary imperative of Title VII to provide equal
employment opportunities to women and justifies allowing
women guards to search physically the bodies of male
prisoners and to monitor them visually in states of undress
in their living quarters. However, as Jurado points out, the
converse is not true. The broader judicial construction of
women's privacy needs is balanced against a less weighty
interest in expanding the employment opportunities of men
in women's prisons.
Undeniably, incarcerated women need the protection
of privacy to police appropriate and inappropriate
governmental intrusions upon their bodies at the hands of
male guards. There is a strong correlation between crossgender searches and custodial sexual misconduct among
male guards. The power disparity that exists between men
and women in society is magnified within the rigidly
Power is
hierarchical and closed prison apparatus.

24. See Jurado, supra note 12, at 53; Nicole Hahn Rafter, Partial Justice:
Women, Prisons and Social Control 49 (2d ed. 1990).
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sexualized in prison." Because prison guards exercise near
total authority over prisoners, the potential for male
guards to abuse their legitimate access to women's bodies
to conduct bodily searches of women and to visually
monitor them nude or only partially dressed in ways that
are overtly sexual is great. Indeed, in a major report on the
sexual abuse of women prisoners, Human Rights Watch
found that male correctional officers misused their search
authority to have inappropriate sexual contact with female
prisoners."
This finding led to a recommendation that all states
limit cross-gender strip searches, pat-frisks and
inappropriate cross-gender visual surveillance of female
prisoners. 27
The link between cross-gender searches and custodial
sexual misconduct uniquely burdens women prisoners
because women are more likely than men to be subjected to
cross-gender searches" and more likely
than men to be the
29
objects of custodial sexual misconduct.
25. See generally Miller, supra note 9.
26. Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 1-2 (noting that "[m]ale officers
have used mandatory pat-frisks or room searches to grope women's breasts,
buttocks, and vaginal areas and to view them inappropriately while in a state of
undress in the housing or bathroom areas.").
27. Id. at 13-14. In an expose on violations of women's human rights, Amnesty
International reported the concerns of the Human Rights Committee that the
practice of assigning men to guard women prisoners in contact positions leads to
the sexual abuse of women prisoners and the invasion of their privacy. The
committee called on states to amend legislation to provide that male officers
guarding women would always be accompanied by a female officer. See Amnesty
International, "Not Part of My Sentence": Violations of Human Rights of Women
in Custody 55-56, AMR 51/01/99, Mar. 1999.
28. Although the state prison systems vary in their correctional staff
demographics and search policies, in general, women are more likely to be
guarded by men and men are less likely to be guarded by women because of the
vastly greater number of incarcerated men and the general underrepresentation
of women in the field of corrections. Unless a state department of corrections
takes it upon itself to limit the assignment of men to contact positions in women's
prisons-as Hawaii and Wisconsin have done in the past-, the general trend
stands. Such limitations frequently contravene labor union contracts forbidding
gender-based correctional
staff assignments. See generally Amnesty
International, supra note 27, at 52.
29. Custodial sexual misconduct certainly occurs in men's prisons; however its
occurrence at the hands of female guards is far less frequent than its corollary in
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Despite the needed protection afforded to women by
the invocation of stereotypes, the concept of privacy as it
has been applied to cross-gender searches presents
difficulties for both men and women. Prisoners need to be
able to shield their bodies in order to preserve their human
dignity, but privacy as it is currently formulated is too
susceptible to harmful gender bias. An understanding of
privacy that is highly contextualized and grounded in
fundamental respect for human dignity and bodily integrity
is needed. Privacy conceptualized as a right to bodily
integrity would inhere to the human body-rather than
rely on biased notions of modesty-and would therefore
reflect a dual standard for men and women. Moreover, if
courts determined the degree to which prisoners need
protection from cross-gender searches based upon concrete,
case-by-case determinations of institutional safety and
prisoner vulnerability in specific factual settings, privacy
would be less likely to reflect gendered stereotypes and
ideals.
There are tremendous conceptual difficulties in basing
the protection of women subject to cross-gender searches on
gendered stereotypes about men and women. First, by
employing stereotypes of women that afford female
prisoners greater privacy than male prisoners, federal
judges have constructed a doctrinal "bubble" around
incarcerated women. Within this limited bubble, judges'
concern for the modesty of incarcerated women is linked to
stereotyped notions of women in traditional roles as
mothers, asexual nurturers, and sexual victims.
The
greater degree of protection afforded women prisoners
through privacy doctrine is wildly disproportionate to the
harsh treatment of women in every other aspect of their
incarceration. As a small minority of prisoners viewed as
extrinsic to the "traditionally male" system of
imprisonment, women are generally disadvantaged in
comparison to their male counterparts.
For example,
women's prisons. Furthermore, whereas most sexual assaults on women prisoners
are perpetrated by male guards and staff, most sexual assaults on male prisoners
are committed by fellow prisoners.
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women constitute a mere six percent of all prisoners.
Consequently there are far fewer correctional facilities in
which to confine them. Within the existing facilities,
women tend to be "over-incarcerated," 0 that is confined in
higher security facilities even though they commit far
fewer violent crimes than men. Women are also
incarcerated farther away from home than men, in general,
making visitation more arduous and increasing the
likelihood that family ties will deteriorate. Women's
prisons generally lack the kind of vocational training
provided in men's prison and which creates better
employment options for men when they are released from
prison. Yet courts have refused to interpret the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require
the same programs in men's and women's prisons, finding
instead that incarcerated men and women are not similarly
situated."
Second, gendered stereotypes are a shaky foundation
upon which to base needed protections for incarcerated
women when there is so little that remains of privacy. In
light of Hudson and Turner, cases which narrowly
restricted the scope of Fourth Amendment privacy in
prison and revived the "hands off' approach to judicial
review of search policies prison officials insist are necessary
to maintain internal order, the stereotypes are almost all
that remain of privacy in prison. When these stereotypes
are exploded, there is little left with which to protect
incarcerated women from sexualized abuses of power.
Third, the gendered stereotypes upon which judges
rely in expanding the privacy rights of women are harmful
because they actively participate in constructing the reality
of everyday prison life. For example, when judges presume
the sexual vulnerability of female prisoners, they
conversely presume that male guards are sexually
30. See Dreama G. Moon et al., Women Prisoners: A Forgotten Population 1213 (1990).
31. See Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1185 (1995), afid in part, rev'd in part, and vacated in part on other
grounds, 107 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 1997).
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aggressive. When judges employ gendered stereotypes of
men as sexually aggressive, and therefore limit the

assignment of male guards within the housing units of
women's prisons, they are accepting as a given that male
guards are unable to respect the human dignity of women
when observing them nude in the act of toileting,
showering, and undressing. In accepting this duality of
aggression and vulnerability, judges are not just
rationalizing outcomes they can feel comfortable with on

the basis

of presumed

traits.

They are

actually

constructing a reality within prisons. They are ultimately
writing rules around the fact that "boys will be boys" rather
than facilitating a culture change within prisons that
requires male guards to conduct themselves professionally,

and in the process, to respect the basic human dignity of
women prisoners.
Take, for example, the rules regarding the
accommodation of privacy where guards visually monitor
nude prisoners in the acts of toileting, showering, and
undressing. Rebecca Jurado invokes the cross-gender
surveillance case of Forts v. Ward3 2 to demonstrate the
32. Forts v. Ward, 434 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 566 F.2d 849 (2d Cir.
1977), remanded to 471 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part on other
grounds, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980). In Forts, women incarcerated in maximum
security Bedford Hills (N.Y.) Correctional Facility challenged a newly initiated
policy of assigning male guards to monitor the prisoners visually in the infirmary
and in their living quarters. The district court initially enjoined the policy,
holding that it violated the women's constitutional right to privacy without
serving a compelling state interest. Forts, 434 F. Supp. at 949. The district judge
was particularly troubled by the lengths to which female inmates were required
to go to preserve their privacy. Although partial curtains covered the doorway of
each cell, Judge Owen was concerned by allegations that male officers peeked
over the curtains and pushed them aside. He was also concerned that male
guards could observe the partially naked bodies of female prisoners while they
slept and that female prisoners were required to discuss "personal, female
problems" with hospital staff in the presence of male officers. Id. at 949.
Consequently, Judge Owen later rejected proposals by the State defendants to
accommodate the women's privacy by issuing "Dr. Denton" sleepwear upon
request and changing the prison rules to allow the women a fifteen-minute
interval in which to cover their cell door windows at night. Forts, 471 F. Supp. at
1099. On remand from the Second Circuit, the district judge, inter alia,
prohibited male guards from patrolling the housing units at night when inmates
could be observed by guards in states of undress. Id. at 1101. On appeal, the
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absurd results of attempts to accommodate conflicting
claims to privacy by incarcerated women and to
employment rights by male guards. The accommodations
included requiring the State of New York to provide Dr.
Denton sleepwear-those footed pajamas reminiscent of
childhood-that would completely encase the women's
bodies, thereby making them less alluring to the guards
and allowing female prisoners to cover their cell doors for

fifteen minutes at night so they could attend to "personal
hygiene." Nevertheless, Jurado observes that when male
prisoners challenging cross-gender surveillance policies in
men's prisons similarly seek to shield their bodies from the
prying eyes of female guards, federal courts refuse to
provide accommodations2
Thus, judges accepting the stereotype of the sexually
vulnerable female (and the correlative stereotype of
sexually aggressive male guard) and using it as a basis for
affording women prisoners (and refusing male prisoners)
privacy accommodations, construct an environment in

Second Circuit vacated the part of Judge Owen's order that banned male guards
from nighttime assignments in the inmates' living quarters, finding the
accommodations proposed by the Department of Corrections to be sufficient to
protect both the privacy interests of the inmates and the employment interests of
the guards. Forts, 6210 F.2d at 1217.
33. See Jurado, supra note 12, at 38. Jurado contrasts the Second Circuit's
accommodation of female prisoners' privacy in Forts with male prisoners' privacybased challenges in Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 851 (1997), Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988), and
Grummet v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985), to make the point that the
judicial policy of accommodating prisoners' privacy is gender-specific. In other
words, where men seek privacy protection from the eyes of female guards upon
their naked bodies, judges deny them relief. In each of these three Ninth Circuit
cases, male prisoners sought to keep the eyes of female prison guards off their
bodies when they were undressed. Somers involved female guards conducting
visual body cavity searches on a male inmate on a regular basis in violation of
prison regulations prohibiting unclothed body inspection by guards of the opposite
sex absent an emergency. Michenfelder involved strip searches of male prisoners
in view of female guards. Grummet involved female correctional officers viewing
male inmates partially or totally nude while dressing, showering, being strip
searched, or toileting. In none of these cases did the Ninth Circuit seek to
accommodate the privacy concerns of male prisoners. And in each of these cases,
internal security and equal employment were factored against a broader
interpretation of male prisoners' privacy rights.
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prisons that privileges male sexual irresponsibility. In the
process, judges (including the district court judge and the
Second Circuit panel in Forts) end up juggling choices
among footed pajamas, translucent privacy screens, and
mottled glass shower doors rather than insisting on a
culture change that would require male guards to respect
the human dignity of female prisoners. 4
Thirdly, the use of gendered stereotypes to expand the
privacy of women prisoners is problematic because judges
idealize, rather than contextualize, the experiences of
incarcerated women. In doing so, they overlook the
protection of those women whose experiences do not fit the
stereotype. Judicial resolution of privacy-based challenges
to cross-gender search policies requires a contextualized
understanding of how the many varied aspects of men and
women
prisoners'
identities
shape their
privacy
expectations. Gender does not exist in isolation from other
components of the identities of male and female prisoners.
The men and women subjected to cross-gender searches
possess racial and class attributes and sexual histories that
influence their perceptions of cross-gender searches. These
attributes also influence judicial perceptions of prisoners'
sensibilities and guards' behavioral proclivities. Among
women incarcerated in the U.S., most are women of color,
and most are poor. Many are lesbian, bisexual, and/or
transgendered.
All these factors
complicate how
incarcerated women as well as men experience crossgender searches. Factor in as well the race, class, and
sexualities of the guards conducting the searches and a
judge would be hard pressed to discern the parameters of
privacy in a manner that addresses the complex realities of
34. Further evidence that the environment within many prisons privileges
masculinist values is the fact that female correctional officers broadly complain of
sexual harassment by their male colleagues. Women guards report being
propositioned in front of inmates by their male colleagues and being threatened
with poor duty assignments or termination to gain their sexual acquiescence. The
harassment serves to reinforce the status of women guards as "outsiders" in a
field traditionally reserved to men. See Jocelyn Pollock, Women in Corrections, in
Women, Law and Social Control 97, 101 (Alida Merlo & Jocelyn Pollock eds.,
1995).
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prison life. Perhaps that is why judges have largely failed
to consider the sexuality of guards and prisoners in their
legal analysis of privacy in cross-gender searches," despite
its obvious relevance in the highly sexualized prison
environment.
Falling to consider how sexuality complicates the
privacy analysis in cross-gender search cases provides a
powerful example of how courts fail to contextualize
privacy. Judges construct a doctrine that overlooks the
needs of-and consequently under-protects-lesbian,
bisexual, and transgendered women."
A heterosexual
presumption lurks within the doctrine of cross-gender
searches.
Judges limit their privacy analysis of
surveillance in prisoners' living quarters-where they may
be observed naked while showering, toileting, and
undressing-to searches conducted by guards of the

opposite sex.

When judges place limits on cross-gender

surveillance of naked prisoners by guards of the opposite

sex, they assume that its is degrading to be view unclothed
by a stranger of the opposite sex only. 7This presumes that
35. But see Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994). The Canedy
court pointed out the presumption of heterosexuality within the cross-gender
search cases:
We note that York [v. Story], many of the cases discussed below involving
cross-gender observations and strip searches, as well as Canedy's brief on
appeal here, make a common assumption. In their declaration that "the
nudity taboo, and hence the invasion of privacy involved when it is forcibly
broken, is much greater between the sexes than among members of the
same sex,": P1. Br. at 13, these authorities and submissions appear to
assume that all of the relevant actors are heterosexual.
Id. at 185 n.1 (emphasis added). Citing Canedy, the Seventh Circuit in Johnson
v. Phelan refused to consider the sexuality of guards and prisoners in its privacy
analysis, stating that "jt]here are too many permutations to place guards and
prisoners into multiple classes by sex, sexual orientation, and perhaps other
criteria, allowing each group to be observed only by the corresponding groups that
occasion the least happiness." 69 F.3d 144, 147 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1006 (1996).
36. In fact, lesbian and transgendered inmates are often singled out for sexual
misconduct by guards. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 1, at 2.
37. This is evidence of a judicial assumption that a certain power dynamic is
at work that links the probability of guard misconduct to prisoner vulnerability.
In cross-gender search doctrine, the power dynamic is always gendered and
(hetero)sexed (i.e., female prisoners are presumed to be at greater risk when male
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the relevant actors are heterosexual and precludes the
application of a privacy analysis in situations where guards
gaze upon the naked bodies of same-sex prisoners or
intrusively touch their bodies. 8 This assumption was
recently acknowledged by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals on two occasions.39 However, because prisons are
sites of complex and transitional sexualities, judges must
factor sexual orientation into their gender analysis if they
are to interpret privacy in a manner that deals realistically
with the contours of life in prison. Until they do, gender
stereotypes within the doctrine of cross-gender searches
will remain a shaky foundation upon which to support
women's privacy.

I. WHAT MIGHT A FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY IN
CROSS-GENDER SEARCHES LOOK LIKE?

Feminist legal theory has grappled with the benefits
and shortcomings of a privacy-based approach to securing
women's liberty and equality for the past forty years. Ever
since Roe v. Wade,40 when the U.S. Supreme Court read the
constitutional right of privacy to protect women from

guards visually monitor them in states of undress than when male prisoners are
identically monitored by female guards).
38. See Miller, supra note 9, at 351:
[One] aspect of confusion within the doctrine of cross- gender searches
relates to an unspoken, nevertheless pervasive assumption that only visual
surveillance by a member of the opposite sex is problematic. There are
many instances of sexual intimidation through gazing, which cannot be
addressed within a conventional heterosexual paradigm of gender. The
fact that same sex surveillance of the nude bodies of prisoners is implicitly
unproblematic in these cases is troubling. It is evidence of a heterosexual
presumption that is hardly appropriate in the transgendered context of
prison. Furthermore, it exempts from judicial scrutiny the same type of
sexually intimidating gazing that, if practiced across gender or in the (noncarceral) workplace, would be problematic. Male prisoners observed naked
by gay male guards have no cognizable Fourth Amendment claim; likewise
for female prisoners viewed naked by lesbian guards. And what of
transgendered prisoners under the eye of guards of either sex? (citation
omitted).
39. See cases cited supra note 35.
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
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governmental intrusion into the choice of whether or not to
terminate pregnancies, feminists have closely analyzed the
evolution of privacy doctrine and its implications for
women's empowerment. First, they have criticized the
protection of women's reproductive freedom through the
creation of separate spheres. Catherine MacKinnon
observed that within the liberal state, the tension between
precluding governmental intrusion and protecting personal
self-action was resolved by the judicial demarcation of a
private sphere of marriage, home, and family, in which the
state is restrained from intruding into matters of
(hetero)sexuality, including contraception, pornography,
and abortion.4 ' MacKinnon criticized this doctrinal
approach-translating the ideology of the private sphere
into an individual legal right to privacy-as a means of
subordinating the collective needs of women to the
imperatives of male supremacy. 42 Privacy doctrine protects
women's procreative choices by prohibiting governmental
interference in the private sphere of home and family.
Meanwhile, however, the exclusion of women from the
public sphere leads to their dependence upon men for goods
such as money, legal rights, and prestige.43 This
dependence, feminist legal theorists contend, reinforces the
subordination of women in the lower-status private sphere,
causing even extreme incidents of oppression within the
private sphere-domestic violence, spousal rape-to go
44
unnoticed by society.

Secondly, the feminist critique of privacy has drawn
attention to the legitimating function of privacy that
perpetuates the status quo by conceptualizing privacy as a
negative right of protection against improper state
41. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in
Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 96 (1987).
42. See id. at 96-97.
43. See Laura Stein, Living With the Risk of Backfire: A Response to the
Feminist Critiques of Privacy and Equality, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 1153, 1162 (1993).
44. See MacKinnon, supra note 41, at 101; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Violence of Privacy, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 973 (1991) (criticizing the separate
spheres ideology within privacy doctrine for encouraging and reinforcing violence
against women).
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interference, but with no correlative, affirmative
governmental obligation to guarantee reproductive
freedom.45 In this respect, asserts feminist legal scholar
Laura Stein, privacy is "decidedly non-transformative."46
Subsequent critiques of privacy doctrine by other
feminist legal theorists followed and solidified what has
been called
the anti-privacy position of feminist legal
47
theory.
More recently, a counter-critique emerged. Conceived
by feminists of color, this racial critique of the feminist
critique of privacy criticizes the rejection of privacy
doctrine by feminist legal theorists for (1) narrowly
defining women's reproductive freedom in terms of abortion
rights rather than examining the range of forces limiting
the reproductive liberty of poor women of color; 4 (2) failing
to take into account the more complex, racialized
significance of the private sphere "as the site of solace and
resistance against racial oppression" for women of color; 49
and (3) identifying gender as the sole locus of women's
oppression and therefore ignoring racial and economic
subordination. Through counter-critique, these legal
45. See MacKinnon, supra note 41, at 100-02; Frances Olsen, Constitutional
Law: Feminist Critiques Of the Public/Private Distinction, 10 Const. Comment.
319, 326 (1993) (explaining how, within the hierarchical context of the home and
family, liberal notions of privacy maintain the status quo by assuming that the
relevant actors are equals).
46. See Stein, supra note 43, at 1157.
47. See Rhonda Copelon, Unpacking Patriarchy: Reproduction, Sexuality,
Originalism and Constitutional Change, in A Less Than Perfect Union:
Alternative Perspectives on the U.S. Constitution (Jules Lobel ed., 1988); see also
Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1
(1992); Ruth Colker, 3 Colum. J. Gender & L. 449, 478 (1993) (criticizing the
class-based privilege found in privacy doctrine when it is applied to women who
are seeking reproductive freedom); Ruth Colker, Pornography and Privacy.
Towards the Development of a Group-Based Theory for Sex-Based Intrusions of
Privacy, 1 L. & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice 191 (1983)
(examining privacy doctrine's failure to protect women from sex-based invasions
of privacy).
48. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Rave, Reproduction and
the Meaning of Liberty 300 (1997) [hereinafter Roberts, Killing the Black Body].
49. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality and the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1471
(1991) [hereinafter Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts].
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scholars seek to reclaim the right of privacy for women of
color.

50

Whereas MacKinnons feminist critique of privacy
emphasizes the shortcomings of privacy-based protections
of women's reproductive choices, Roberts' racial critique of
the feminist critique of reproductive privacy advances our
understanding of how privacy-properly contextualizedcan be reconstructed to make the doctrine more effective.
MacKinnon faults the doctrine of procreative privacy for its
liberal presumption that individuals act autonomously,
freely, and equally in spite of huge disparities in power
between men and women. MacKinnon further criticizes
the doctrinal formulation of privacy for preserving the
status quo by failing to destabilize the power disparities
between men and women. Privacy is formulated as a
negative right that entitles women merely to governmental
non-intervention. MacKinnon contends that by failing to
require social changes that would eliminate women's
inequality to men, privacy doctrine perpetuates the sexual
oppression that requires women to seek abortions in the
first place (i.e., male control over sexuality).51
In contrast, Roberts resurrects the doctrine of privacy

50. Black feminists first articulated the counter-critique of privacy and sought
to reclaim privacy for its valuing of personhood and protection of women against
the abuse of governmental power. They recognized that the existing critique of
privacy did not reflect the racial and class context in which women of color
experience privacy, currently or historically. See Roberts, supra note 46; see also
Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories: The Constitution and Family Values
(1997). Indeed it is telling that Dorothy Roberts' pathbreaking article articulating
the racial critique of the feminist critique of privacy, Punishing Drug Addicts Who
Have Babies, deals with the criminal prosecution of poor Black female crack
addicts for giving birth to infants who test positive for drugs. Because the lives of
poor Black women are heavily regulated by state agencies-welfare, child
protection, the foster care system, and the criminal justice system in particularissues of procreative privacy frequently arise in the context of criminal
prosecution or incarceration.
More recently, other critical feminists have
embraced the counter-critique. See, e.g., Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects:
Feminists Essays in Legal and Social Theory 82 (1998) ("[Flrom a feminist point
of view, it is far from clear that a critique of the public/private dichotomy should
bring with it a total rejection of the notion that privacy can be valuable and ought
sometimes to be protected by state and other powerful institutions.").
51. See MacKinnon, supra note 41, at 97.
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condemned by MacKinnon and reclaims it on behalf of
women of color. Their historical experiences of being
denied rights and being socially devalued as mothers
underscore the significance of formulating protection of
their procreative choices as a legal right-one that stresses
the value of personhood and protects against totalitarian
abuse of governmental power.
Roberts criticizes the
feminist critique of privacy for neglecting the concerns of
poor women of color who simultaneously experience various
forms of oppression "as a complex interaction of race,
gender and class."53 She argues for a new jurisprudence of
reproductive privacy that, inter alia, shifts the focus from
state non-intervention to an affirmative guarantee of
personhood.
Roberts demonstrates that examining the experiences
of women in the context of racial discrimination and
economic disadvantage and formulating a privacy right
that protects them leads to a doctrine of privacy that
advances social justice and more fully protects everyone.5 4
For example, among women claiming procreative privacy,
poverty, subordination, and racial oppression influence the
nature of the privacy claim. In Killing the Black Body:
Race, Reproduction and the Meaning of Liberty, Roberts
explains that racial oppression and economic disadvantage
shape the meaning of black women's claims to procreative
privacy."5 She suggests that understanding the context in
which their privacy claims arise-in other words by
"addressing the particular concerns of Black women" 56-- a
fuller vision of reproductive freedom is realized:
[Black women's'] reproductive freedom, for example, is
limited not only by the denial of access to safe abortions, but
also by the lack of resources necessary for a healthy
pregnancy and parenting relationship. Their choices are

52. See Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 49, at 1468.
53. Id. at 1424.
54. Id. at 1464.
55. See Roberts, Killing the Black Body, supra note 48, at 300.
56. Id. at 301.
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limited not only by direct government interference in their
decisions, but also by government's failure to facilitate
them .... Addressing the particular concerns of Black
women helps to expand our vision of reproductive freedom
to include the full scope of what it means to have control
over one's reproductive life."
The doctrine of privacy that has evolved in the context
of cross-gender searches has barely been addressed from a
feminist perspective, even though feminist legal theory has
been extensively applied to the analysis women's
procreative privacy. I can identify at least three possible
reasons for this. At first glance, procreative privacy and
the bodily privacy of prisoners appear unrelated. They are
doctrinally distinct in that they derive from different
constitutional guarantees.
Procreative privacy derives
from the liberty that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, whereas constitutional protection
against bodily searches by opposite sex guards derives
primarily from the Fourth Amendment and Eighth
Amendments. Nevertheless, the common goal of women
prisoners subject to cross-gender searches and women
making abortion-related decisions is bodily integrityprotection from governmental intrusions upon their bodies
to prevent either termination of pregnancy or the physical
search of their bodies. In other words, these women share
the desire to keep the hands of the government off their
bodies.
A second reason feminist legal theorists may have
overlooked cross-gender searches is the deceptive
appearance that women benefit from gendered stereotypes
within the doctrine. The resolution of the conflict between
prisoner privacy and the employment rights of guards has
resulted in greater employment rights for women guards at
the expense of privacy for male prisoners. In balancing the
penological objectives of prison officials against the privacy
interest of prisoners, courts have generally held that the

57. Id. at 300.
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expectation of privacy for male prisoners is low"5 and that
the penological objective of eliminating discrimination
against women in staff pursuant to Title VII mandate is
high.59
Conversely, the resolution of the employment
rights/privacy rights conflict has resulted in expanded
privacy protections for women prisoners at minimal
expense to the employment rights of guards. The reason is
two-fold. Courts have generally held that the privacy
interests of female prisoners are high (in other words
higher than those afforded male prisoners) and therefore
outweigh any de minimis burden on male guards'
employment rights. The burden is de minimis because no
mandate exists under Title VII to end sex discrimination
against men in the field of corrections. In sum, judges are
more comfortable seeing women search men than men
search women, particularly when those searches involve
visual surveillance of naked bodies toileting, showering,
and sleeping or manual inspection of breasts and/or
genitalia. Striking the balance between employment rights
and privacy in favor of women prisoners did not, I suspect,
elevate the critique of cross-gender search doctrine to a top
priority for feminist legal scholars. Why fix a doctrine that
does not appear to be broken-which, indeed, seems to
benefit women over men?
A third reason feminist legal theorists may not have
focused on cross-gender searches is that the experiences of
poor women of color have been historically under-theorized
by feminists-replicating the general failure of American
legal theory to take an interest in the experiences of poor
women of color. Prior to the work of Black feminists who
challenged the notion of gender as the sole locus of women's
oppression by describing the multiple oppressions of

58. See Bagley v. Watson, 579 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Or. 1983).
59. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 334 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying the
rational relationship test of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), and holding that
the Nevada State Prison's deployment of female guards to monitor visually male
prisoners while showering and within sight of strip searches was permissible
because it was reasonable related to the legitimate penological objective of
providing equal employment opportunities).
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women of color (e.g., racial and economic, as well as sexual
oppression), the privacy analysis of feminist jurisprudence
reflected a white, middle-class bias that left unexplored the
complex ways in which women of color, including
incarcerated women, experience privacy. Once again, this
replicates the failure of American legal theory generally to
take an interest in the lives of prisoners.
Nevertheless, feminist legal theory and its insights
into privacy can help prison scholars appreciate the
shortcomings and advantages of relying upon privacy to
protect prisoners from the prying eyes and hands of the
state within the doctrine of cross-gender searches. Both
the feminist critique of privacy and the subsequent racial
critique of it give us tools for understanding the complex
role of privacy claims in legal challenges to cross-gender
searches.
In both procreative privacy and prisoners' bodily
privacy, the deployment of sexualized, patriarchal power is
similar. In critiquing the use of privacy to protect the
rights of women seeking abortions, feminist legal theorists
demonstrated that the division of the world into separate
public and private spheres ultimately functioned to oppress
women. Within the private sphere of home and family,
patriarchal power is magnified by virtue of women's
exclusion from the public sphere, and, women's power is
diminished by their resulting dependence on men. As a
consequence, extreme abuses of power within the homesuch as domestic violence and spousal rape-go unnoticed
by society.6" Thus, privacy functions as a veneer that
obscures the sexual oppression of women by protecting and
simultaneously disempowering them in an isolated sphere.
Likewise prisons-although they are quintessentially
public institutions-exist within a separate, "closed" sphere
of discipline and punishment. Federal courts hearing
prisoners' privacy-based challenges to cross-gender
searches traditionally weighed the institutional interests of
the prison system against the interests of prisoners in
60. See Stein, supra note 43, at 1161-62.
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bodily privacy. However, after Turner imposed a mere
"rational basis" test on such challenges, the judgements of
prison administrators became all but dispositive.61 Like the
patriarchal authority of the husband within the
traditionally ordered home, the authority of prison
administrators within the prison cannot be gainsaid.6 2 Like
the authority of the husband, the authority of prison
officials who set cross-gender search policies is both
patriarchal6 and sexualized.s The exclusion of prisoners
from the less controlled sphere of life outside of prison
became more complete as conditions in prison became
increasingly harsh and the Drug War's lengthy, mandatory
minimum sentences made release dates more remote.
In addition to disempowering women in a separate
sphere, feminists also criticize privacy for legitimating the
This criticism is reflected in Jurado's
status quo.
discussion of gendered stereotypes in the doctrine of crossgender searches. Jurado exposes the existence of a doublestandard for accommodations of prisoners' privacy-women
get accommodations; men do not. She demonstrates that
the double-standard is rooted in gendered stereotypes
about the traditional roles of men and women in penal and
social ideology. Revealing the operation of gender biases in
judicial determinations of the scope of prisoner privacy,
Jurado illustrates how privacy in the prison context
legitimates and preserves the status quo by looking to
61. "[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights,
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests. In our view, such a standard is necessary if'prison administrators'...
and not the courts, are to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional
operations." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Although Turner requires the policies of
prison administrators to have a "legitimate penological objective," maintaining
internal security is a legitimate objective broad enough in scope to justify almost
any penal practice short of torture.
62. Ironically, the U.S. Supreme Court announced in Hudson v. Palmer that
"a prison 'shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home... .'" 468 U.S. at 527
(quoting Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962)).
63. Men have historically operated and administered the U.S. prison system.
Even when women operated reformatories as matrons during the Progressive
Era, they were confined by male authority to narrow, sexually stereotyped roles
and excluded from men's prisons. See Rafter, supra note 24, at 46.
64. See generally Miller, supra note 9, at 293-95.
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perceptions of modesty within men and women's traditional
gender roles.65
The racial critique of the feminist critique of privacy
advances our understanding of the promise and limitations
of privacy doctrine as it is applied to cross-gender searches.
Its emphasis on understanding privacy in the context of the
social and historical experiences of those claiming its
protection suggests that analysis of the multiple
oppressions of prisoners challenging cross-gender searches
is necessary.
First, prisoners-like poor black women seeking access
to safe abortions-assert privacy claims on a broad
landscape of oppression. Stereotyped as either sexual
aggressors or sexual victims and presumed to be
heterosexual, their privacy claims are narrowly interpreted
as claims about sexual morality. However, given the actual
context in which prisoners raise privacy-based objections to
cross-gender searches, they are more broadly contesting
their denigration by the prison system. For example, the
links between male guards having access to women
prisoners in their housing units and custodial sexual
misconduct clearly prompt privacy-based challenges
to
cross-gender searches by incarcerated women.
But
physical security is not the only goal these challenges seek
to achieve. Prison life in an era of "getting tough" on
prisoners and mass incarceration is dehumanizing. For
many of the poor, mostly Black inmates who populate
America's prisons and jails, this dehumanization by the
state echoes similar experiences of personal devaluation in
the welfare, foster care, and juvenile justice systems as
well. Understanding these experiences of subordination
helps us to view the privacy-based challenges to crossgender searches more broadly as claims to human dignity
and personhood generally denied prisoners. Thus, a
concept of privacy that stresses both the value of
personhood and protects against the totalitarian abuse of
65. The reliance is misplaced in the context of prisons, institutions in which
gender and sexuality are very fluid concepts. See id. at 351.
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power is needed.
Jurado's discussion of gendered stereotypes within the
doctrine of cross-gender searches mirrors feminism's
critique of privacy and similarly overlooks sources of
oppression beyond gender. For example, Jurado recounts
the historical reformatory treatment of women and how
they were re-formed to embrace traditional societal roles.
She describes the emergence of a gender dualism in the
historical divergence of reformatory treatment from the
custodial model of male punishment. However, the racial
context in which the divergence occurred is ignored.
Race had a defining role in the gender-segregated
reformatory system. Black women were excluded from this
more benign form of incarceration. The heart of the
reformatory philosophy was restoring "fallen" women to
their traditional roles in society. The reformatory model
emerged at a time in which massive European immigration
and high unemployment put many women on the city
streets, challenging traditional gender roles and sexual
morality. The fact that most women who were committed
to reformatories as youths were convicted of crimes against
chastity attests to the broader social agenda of the
reformatory movement to transform loose girls into
respectable women. Black women were virtually excluded
from the reformatory system because they were not seen as
worthy of reform." The abstraction of an idealized, genteel
woman to which poor European immigrant women were
being "trained" to conform never contemplated the
inclusion of Black women.
Therefore, Black women
endured far harsher conditions of confinement within
custodial prisons and did not benefit from the chivalry
extended to white women.6 7
In contrast to the feminist critique of privacy, the
racial critique of the feminist critique sets as a benchmark
respect for basic human dignity by interpreting women's
66. "Reformatory officials wished to work with women who were worthy of
reform-a viewpoint that, for them and the judges who made the commitments,
disqualified most blacks." Rafter, supra note 24, at 37.
67. Id. at 134
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experiences of privacy in the context of race, class, and
other factors specific to the prison setting. Consistent with
the view of feminists of color, prison scholars analyzing
privacy in cross-gender searches must consider the
experiences of poor, incarcerated women of color and
reconstruct a concept of privacy that protects prisoners
from abuses of authority by guards by respecting bodily
integrity and valuing personhood.
On the basis of anecdotal evidence alone, one can see
that the experiences of poor women of color in New York
State prisons exemplify the need for a contextualized
notion of personal privacy that goes beyond gendered
stereotypes to vest privacy in the body. In New York State,
the vast majority of correctional facilities are located in
rural areas, the majority of prison guards are white men
who live in these rural areas, and the majority of
incarcerated women are poor, Black, and from urban areas
of New York State (primarily New York City's five
boroughs). When a correctional officer puts his hands on a
female prisoner or visually monitors her showering,
toileting, or dressing, this gendered interaction-the search
itself-occurs in a distinct racial and cultural context. It is
no secret that most guards (male or female) prefer to work
in men's prisons. Within the masculinist culture and
history of imprisonment, men's prisons are where the "real
work" is done, and women's prisons exist as an odd
deviation from, or exception to, that tradition. From what
I have observed teaching in and touring women's prisons in
New York State over the past five years, the culture of
female incarceration is one in which male guards do not
respect prisoners because they fail to meet an ideal of
female gentility that is white and middle-class. 6

The

women whose lives they control bear little cultural
resemblance to women they know as family or friends, and
no resemblance at all to their idealized notion of
womanhood. It is not uncommon to hear guards refer to
68. This is the same reason Black women were excluded from reformatories
during the Progressive Era.
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individual women by animal names (e.g., gerbil, bunny,
and beast) and to describe units where they are housed
with names appropriate to a zoo ("Jurassic Park" or the
"Monkey House"). It is easy to see how sexual abuses of
authority can occur in an environment where women are
not respected and where sex can be used as a tool for
disciplining women to fit a specific culture role. Every
state has a different culture of female incarceration;
nevertheless the experiences of women incarcerated in New
York State furnish a good example of how the experiences
of poor Black women argue for a concept of privacy that
inheres to the body.
This reformulated, contextualized right of bodily
privacy is simultaneously more particularized and more
universal, in much the same way as Roberts suggests that
privacy analyzed from the perspective of poor Black women
69
contributes to the broader pursuit of social justice for all.
In spite of the fact that privacy has been gendered in the
doctrine of cross-gender searches, a reconstructed right of
privacy-one that recognizes privacy in the body itself,
regardless of the sex-should not ignore significant
differences in the privacy needs of men and women in the
prison setting.
The construction of a strictly gender-neutral form of
privacy risks reproducing oppression by turning a blind eye
to differences in men's and women's experiences of
incarceration.70 For example, a right of privacy without
69. See supra note 54.
70. This is precisely the criticism feminist legal theorists and critical race
scholars level at the liberal tradition in law. In applying legal principles assumed
to be neutral to actors assumed to be equal and autonomous, the actual (but
unacknowledged) inequality and hierarchy are perpetuated. Strict gender
neutrality simply fails to save the day. In a critique of the existing legal and
policy framework for examining women's poverty, critical race theorist Athena
Mutua suggests an alternative approach with which to address issues of gendered
oppression affecting both men and women. In the context of gendered oppression
in maquilabdoras affecting both Latinos and Latinas, Professor Mutua argues for
legal interventions that are simultaneously women-focussed and men-focussed.
Such an approach, Mutua suggests, has the advantage of neither foreclosing
women-focussed coalitions nor hindering coalitions of women and men. Athena
D. Mutua, Why Retire the 'Feminization of Poverty' Construct?, 78 Denver U.L.
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regard to the sex of the person asserting it may afford
prisoners certain minimal protections in body searches, but
it would obviously afford no greater protection from bodily
searches by guards of the opposite sex than by guards of
the same sex. Thus, female prisoners would be at greater
risk of the kinds of abuse by male guards that have
historically plagued women's penal institutions (and that
led to policies limiting cross-gender assignments in
women's prisons in the first place). Instead, the racial
critique of the feminist critique of privacy by feminists of
color leads us to insist on a formulation of bodily privacy
that takes into account the specific context in which crossgender searches are being conducted, and in doing so,
liberates privacy from the constraints of gendered
stereotypes.
Such a conception of privacy is not foreign to the
Constitution or the courts. In fact, courts deciding the
constitutionality of cross-gender searches in prison have
long looked to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 7' as a source of bodily privacy rooted in human
dignity. In particular, the Ninth Circuit in York v. Story
recognized that "personal dignity and elementary selfrespect"73 is the basis of the desire to shield one's naked
body from the view of strangers, particularly strangers of
Rev. (forthcoming 2001).
71. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law;..."
72. See e.g. Grummet v. Rushen, 587 F. Supp.; 913, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1984), affd;
779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985) Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 619 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 852 (1997); Forts v. Ward, 434 F. Supp. 946, 949 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 566 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1977), on remand, 471 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
and vacated in part by 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980); Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F.
Supp. 201, 203 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir.
1994); Csizmadia v. Fauver, 746 F. Supp. 483, 491 n.11 (D.N.J. 1990); In re Long,
127 Cal. Rptr. 732, 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d
1413, 1415 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 931 (1993).
73. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939
(1964) (finding that a complaint by a female crime victim who was involuntarily
photographed naked in suggestive poses by a police officer who later copied and
distributed the photographs to fellow officers stated a cause of action under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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the opposite sex. Thus, the vulnerability and degradation
engendered when an individual is observed by strangers
naked or stripped of her clothes is what this Fourteenth
Amendment privacy right protects.
However, over the past twenty-five years, significant
judicially imposed limitations upon the exercise of
constitutional rights by prisoners have restricted the scope
of privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. Thus, the ability of courts to animate the
spirit of a privacy right based upon preserving and
respecting prisoners' human dignity is correspondingly
limited. Under the current penal regime, the human
dignity of prisoners takes a back seat to internal security
and punishment. With these priorities, the prison system
is ultimately releasing individuals into the broader society
who, by virtue of being degraded and dehumanized by
prison search procedures, are less likely respect the human
dignity of others.

